In chapter six the author endeavors to propose that the ideas he has been rejecting until this point are not just incorrect, they are heretical.

The author asserts that someone who embraces heresy removes himself from community of believing Jews; he is no longer part of Orthodox Jewry. The author adds that there are significant legal ramifications involved in this, for both the heretic as well as others. Furthermore, the author contends, even if a man does not wish to be a heretic and sincerely feels that he is making no error in judgment, this man is still a heretic and the related consequences still apply.

The author sets out to examine the possibility that the following convictions might be heretical to the Jewish philosophy: 1) The Rebbe is alive and is Moshiach, 2) The Rebbe is dead but may be Moshiach, 3) The Rebbe is dead and will be Moshiach, 4) The Rebbe is dead and has already become Moshiach, and 5) The Rebbe is God.

To meet this need, the author cites from Maimonides' list of principle philosophical affirmations that he felt represent the underlying philosophy of Jewish law. This list has played a significant role in the shaping of national Jewish consciousness during the past nine hundred years since its publication.

Maimonides writes a number of principles affirming the nature of God, which he apparently felt were not derivable from one another. The author cites two of these, one affirming the unity of God and the other the non-corporeality of God. 

The author concludes that any belief that the Rebbe is God, an element of God, or that God is in any way incarnated in the Rebbe would be a rejection of these two principles, and the holder of that belief a heretic.

The author also cites another principle, the affirmation and anticipation of the messianic era including the certainty that the only king for Israel will be a Davidic king by descent through Solomon. This principle is based upon Maimonides' understanding of the prophesies regarding David's monarchy and the messianic era, as well as his convictions regarding the nature of prophesy. The affirmation and anticipation that he details are, in his view, an integral part of the Jewish national character.

With this last principle in mind, the author points out that if someone were to dubiously assume that the Rebbe is Moshiach, then the man who he is expecting will not come, while the true Moshiach -- he is not expecting. This would suggest a breach in the principle of anticipating Moshiach.

He continues by questioning whether the Rebbe is a descendant of Solomon, adding that although the first Lubavitcher Rebbe's lineage is traced to Rashi who, according to legend, descends from David -- his descent is not through Solomon but Solomon's brother. Thus, although the Rebbe descends from first Rebbe through his granddaughter, this is not evidence of his eligibility as Moshiach. The author concludes that Maimonides would require verification of descent through Solomon in order to believe that someone is Moshiach -- a verification which is yet to be made in the case of the Rebbe.

The conviction that the Rebbe is Moshiach, the author suggests, may be a rejection of the principle of affirming and anticipating Moshiach. This is both because the Rebbe is not confirmed to be descendant from Solomon, and because -- as a dead man -- he cannot be Moshiach.

The author returns to addressing the authority of the principles detailed by Maimonides. He cites a medieval Rabbi who asserts that God can, when he so chooses, appear in human form. The author clarifies that at the time these issues were debatable, but at the present these thirteen principles have been accepted by all Jewish legal authorities as a standard. Anyone who disagrees with them today is legally a heretic for all related purposes.

Regarding the remaining belief, that the Rebbe may be Moshiach and that a resurrected Moshiach is an acceptable possibility, the author responds that this contradicts a traditional Jewish belief. According to the author, this belief is not one that would have been conceivable to the sages of yesteryear, and the very rejection of this national position may be enough to render a person a heretic.

Thus, suggests the author, the belief that the Rebbe is in any way God, rejects the affirmations of unity and non-corporeality of God. Any belief that the Rebbe is certainly Moshiach, rejects the affirmation of Solomonic descent. Any belief that the Rebbe -- as a dead man -- is or will be Moshiach, rejects the anticipation for Moshiach. The belief that the Rebbe -- as a dead man -- may be Moshiach, rejects the Jewish national consensus spurning the concept of a resurrected Moshiach. All of these rejections may render the one embracing them a heretic -- for all it is worth.

The author finishes with the statement that he is not at all certain about these conclusions, and calls upon the Jewish legal authorities to make determinations on these issues as the imperative for such decisions increases.

Allow me deal with each of these conclusions:

On the very issue of heresy, the author claims that even if someone does not consider himself heretical, but maintains heretical views, that is still heresy. This is true, but that is in the case where the man is cognizant of his heretical views but does not feel that there is a problem with rejecting the accepted position. It is here that the author blurs an important distinction. If, on the other hand, someone holds a conviction that is antithetical to the very principles to which he himself is committed, but is unaware of the contradiction, this man is certainly no heretic -- he has not rejected anything. The author should be careful when making generalizations in areas of such grave a nature.

Regarding the author's treatment of the subject of the Rebbe being God, I have already displayed (in chapter four) that the author is creating an unrepresentative image which exists only in his imagination. There is no dissension regarding the author's conclusions on the unity of God, and any statement that one will find must be understood within that context. When that is done one will not find fault, let alone heresy, in any of these expressions.

The author makes the absurd suggestion that setting messianic sights on a man who will not be Moshiach involves the rejection of the true Moshiach. Perhaps the author has not thought this through too well -- there is a history among the Jewish people of premature identification of Moshiach. From Rabbi Akiba to modern day this is not at all an uncommon pastime. But -- needless to say -- most of the involved parties, if not all of them, are not anticipating the "true" Moshiach. However, they all understand the concept of Moshiach and expect his arrival; it does not matter if they are also expecting that a certain person or another will be the one to fulfill that prophesy. The author has clearly gone beyond the borders of reasonable deduction in drawing up his proposals. There is certainly no basis for rendering someone with such expectations a heretic.

Regarding the genealogy of the Rebbe, I don't know what the author's source is for regarding the first Lubavitcher Rebbe as descendant from Rashi. I have heard that there is good evidence that his link to David is through Rabbi Judah Loew, the Maharal of Prague, who is not known to descend from Rashi -- although I do not think this information is important. As far as verification for Solomonic descent, it should be noted that in the epistle to Yemen mentioned previously, Maimonides writes that Moshiach's pedigree will be proven by his wondrous acts. While this may or may not reflect practical Jewish law, it certainly reflects the position of Maimonides, who the author is certain would require strict genealogical verification. This is another example of the author's overreaching deductive power. There is clearly nothing wrong, and certainly not heretical, with identifying Moshiach before there is strict evidence of his lineage.

The conviction that the Rebbe is Moshiach, even if dubious, even if the Rebbe does not turn out to have Solomonic descent, is certainly not a rejection of Maimonides' principle of affirming and anticipating the messianic era.

The author goes on to assert that once the Maimonidean principles have been accepted as authoritative they have become the official barometer for heresy. However, the author fails to provide any evidence that it is indeed the case that today's legal establishment holds strictly to the ideas expressed in these principles. However the modern definition of heresy is to be classified, the author concludes that belief that the Rebbe -- dead or alive -- is Moshiach, is certainly on the heretical side of that scale. To this, I will direct the author to peek out of his window and to observe how the Jewish legal authorities are treating this view. I would not be presumptuous to assert that by the standard of today's legal authorities this is certainly not heretical.

Lastly, the author suggests that there is a national Jewish perspective rejecting the concept of a resurrected Moshiach. Failure to maintain this unanimous perspective is in itself heresy. I do not know whether to laugh or to cry. The suggestion that a mere assumption, void of foundation, simply because it is common to Jewry, would become a defining factor in the crucial legal status of heresy is mendacious at best, criminal at worst. Moreover, the author has already provided the reader with sufficient precedent within accepted Judaism for the position of a resurrected Moshiach, it is quite clear that the intolerability of such a view exists solely in the fantasies of the ignorant.

In this chapter I have shown that the author fails to prove that there are legal ramifications for expressing equality between the Rebbe and God. His efforts to prove that the beliefs that the Rebbe is Moshiach, will resurrect as Moshiach, or may resurrect as Moshiach are heretical have been shown to be contrived and unfounded.